

Integrated Offender Management: Pooling Resources and Expertise and Creating Effective Working Partnerships*

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Summary: Integrated offender management (IOM) evolved from a series of related practice experiments in England and Wales which brought together key partners – police, prison, probation, community safety partnerships and the voluntary sector – to find a more focused way to tackle persistent and prolific adult offenders. IOM survived a change of government and has continued to prosper, though the jury is still out about how effective the model is at reducing reoffending. This paper, adapted from the Seventh Martin Tansey Memorial Lecture delivered in April 2014, looks briefly at the history of this initiative, drawing out and interrogating key elements in the operational and strategic structures and the extent of community involvement, considering issues in the setting of a researchable agenda, and setting this in the context of the co-production of services for both adult criminal justice service users and young people in transition to adulthood.

Keywords: Integrated offender management, social inclusion, joined-up justice, co-production, justice policy, probation, policing, community engagement.

I was very interested to learn about the Association for Criminal Justice Research and Development (ACJRD – www.acjrd.ie) because it very much fits the approach I have pursued throughout my career, seeking to maximise the relationship between research, policy and practice in criminal justice. As a researcher running a contract research centre, but following a career in probation including 11 years as a joint appointment with the probation service and the university, and as a probation

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academic, trainer and commentator, my interest has always been in being out in the 'field', working alongside probation, prisons, police and other agencies to share knowledge and find a better way of doing practice. This paper draws on some of the research undertaken, but essentially deals with the policy and practice implications behind the concept of 'integrated offender management' (IOM).

First I want to take you back to the International Corrections and Prisons Association Conference in Budapest in 1999 (The Free Library, 1999) where one of the speakers said: 'crime is best reduced through adherence to the principles of social inclusion, this is the best way to provide protection for communities from the harm and distress caused by crime'. He went on to highlight three particular facets:

- the social exclusion of offenders through incarceration reduces the chances of their effective reintegration and increases the risk of reoffending
- social inclusion requires that offenders accept responsibility to take steps to stop offending and to make reparations; it also requires a response from the community, which recognises a mutual responsibility
- community sanctions provide rigorous and constructive alternatives to imprisonment (The Free Library, 1999).

These comments struck me as giving a useful ethical boundary to the agenda of IOM, which must centrally be concerned with social inclusion.

So who said that? It was, in fact, Martin Tansey himself, speaking at the conference in 1999. Martin went on to summarise the main elements that were required to achieve the social inclusion of offenders:

- accurate assessment of the risk of reoffending and what can be done to reduce that risk
- programmes for offenders that focus on the causes of their offending and on their taking responsibility for their actions
- affirmation of the values of mutual responsibility and respect
- responsiveness to the differences of offenders' circumstances, especially those from minority groups
- programmes aimed at reducing substance abuse
- provisions for social support
- assistance in finding and keeping employment

- opportunities for offenders to make reparations
- consistency in enforcement of the conditions of probation.

Even though they were listed 15 years ago and referenced a much wider probation context, these are very much commitments at the heart of the concept of IOM. Martin's focus on social inclusion is an important legacy and is still relevant today.

I intend to explore, very briefly, the history of the IOM initiative. While I am very positive about the ideas underpinning IOM, there must be a better term, and in thinking about using it in Ireland I hope you will consider some of the alternatives. This paper will draw out and interrogate some of the key elements in the operational and strategic structures, to give an understanding of what needs to be done to make it a successful innovation, to look at the extent of community involvement, and to comment on the researchable agenda that might arise within IOM and some of the problems of IOM.

There is a real opportunity in IOM to enhance the co-production of services focused on offenders and professional staff working together in both adult criminal justice services and young people in transition to adulthood. Finally, I will look at the interplay between practice, policy and research with the backdrop of huge changes to the organisation of probation in England and Wales and therefore the fate of IOM during the summer and autumn of 2014. This is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the future of IOM in England and Wales, but it might be useful for you to know about that so you can avoid reinventing a negative wheel in relation to IOM development in Ireland.

My working at the Hallam Centre for Community Justice (HCCJ) means that this paper will draw on a number of pieces of research and evaluation undertaken, particularly the first national evaluation of IOM, a process evaluation that looked at five pioneer areas in England and Wales (Senior *et al.*, 2011). HCCJ also evaluated Intensive Alternatives to Custody (IAC), which is a different kind of programme but actually builds on some of the same principles (Wong *et al.*, 2012).

We looked in detail at the role of the voluntary sector in IOM (Wong *et al.*, 2011) and at prolific and priority offender evaluations (Feasey *et al.*, 2007, 2009), and at something that came and went briefly called the Vigilance Initiative, which was based on the same principles (Meadows and Senior, 2009). We have looked at IOM in Sussex (Wong *et al.*, 2013), which seems to be quite a successful model, and we have also been

involved in consultancy, developing IOM in South Yorkshire and in Doncaster (Senior and Feasey, 2009).

We have also set up, at the behest of the Home Office, an IOM e-learning platform on the Community Justice Portal (<http://cjp.org.uk/iom-elearning>). This paper draws on other evaluations, particularly the findings from the national evaluations of prolific and priority offenders (PPOs) (Dawson, 2005, 2007), the Diamond Initiative evaluation in London (Dawson *et al.*, 2011), the Home Office surveys of IOM between 2011 and 2013 (Home Office, 2012, 2013), a very recent and useful report written jointly by the inspectorates of probation and the constabulary which was published in March 2014 (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014), and finally a brief look at Transforming Rehabilitation in England and Wales (Ministry of Justice, 2013) and its impact for IOM.

By 2000 there was a growing recognition that while crime was going down consistently year on year, this was not necessarily reducing individual recidivism, and concerns around the causes of this were being expressed. We had this seemingly paradoxical situation across most western countries from the mid-1990s (Garside, 2004). 10% of offenders commit 60% of all crime, 50% of offences are committed by offenders who have already been through the criminal justice system, 4% of those are high crime causers and 60% of offenders sentenced to short-term custody will reoffend within one year (Home Office, 2004, pp. 32–33).

Those statistics, and similar ones, began to emerge at the turn of the century, tending to suggest that there needed to be an approach that targeted resources slightly differently. This so-called ‘revolving door’ of offenders entering the system repeatedly and persistently appeared to be causing most of the stubbornly high reoffending rates. This is the underlying context of the changes that took place under the new Labour government from 1997 to 2011, and I want to briefly sketch these out because it is important to recognise that IOM is not something developed as a pristine and new product: it was something that evolved out of a history of developments over quite a long period of time.

The first relevant change that happened in England was the setting up of Crime and Disorder Partnerships following the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, bringing the local authority and the police together as lead agents with other organisations from the third sector, health, probation, etc. to assess local crime in a much more structured and localised way than had been the case before. People began to look at the nature of local crime and to think about what could be done in their own areas as

distinct from the problems in other areas. This is quite important in understanding the development of IOM.

There was a change in focus in the way the government began to think about how it managed offenders, looking at trends in offender patterns of behaviour and seeking to find systemic solutions. Reducing reoffending became the political watchword: that was what services were set up to achieve, and risk and public protection became foregrounded in a lot of the work of the Probation Service.

This required, during 2003 and 2004, the setting up of Reducing Re-offending Action Plans (NOMS, 2004): each area had to state how it was going to reduce the reoffending of offenders locally, around what became crystallised as the seven pathways. These were seven areas that were identified as key to influencing reductions in offending: employment; housing; children and families; health and mental health; financial inclusion; drugs and alcohol; thinking and attitude (SEU, 2002).

A major report in 2003 (Carter, 2003) had identified so-called ‘silo mentalities’ among the key correctional agencies – police, probation, prison – who, Carter argued, were not working in as coordinated a way as they could. This led to the development of a merged organisation called the National Offender Management Service which brought prison and probation together, although that did not in itself make their work any more integrated – that is for debate elsewhere.

At about the same time, the recognition that this group of offenders were offending with great rapidity produced a focus on what became termed ‘the PPO’. This initiative was driven from the centre, but the CSPs³ often took a lead locally. The programme was tightly prescribed: IOM has never been so scripted, partly due to a change in attitude when the Coalition Government came to power, as civil servants were directed towards localism and became much less interventionist. There were three strands to the PPO initiative:

- *prevent and deter*, which was aimed at younger offenders
- *catch and convict*, which was aimed at the police
- *rehabilitate and resettle*, which was aimed at probation (Dawson, 2005).

³ Community safety partnerships (CSPs) were set up under the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 with representatives from police, local authorities, fire and rescue authorities, Probation Service and health services.

It began to bring probation and police together to think about this population in a more strategic manner. At the same time Drug Intervention Programmes (DIP) also developed: an attempt at end-to-end offender management from arrest to post-custody, whether on any kind of statutory order or not (Skodbo *et al.*, 2007). The drug intervention team could intervene at any point, and that raised another practice concern, namely that you no longer necessarily had to wait until someone was on a statutory order to intervene. This, of course, raised some human rights issues which will be returned to below.

IOM began to be touted in this context of change following the demise of what was called Custody Plus, which was an attempt to introduce statutory supervision for everyone being released from custody. In England and Wales adults released having served sentences of less than 12 months come out with no supervision, and these were the people that were often the most prolific and persistent offenders. Their offending patterns were not necessarily serious, but they were offending persistently and were going back in through the revolving door into prison. Custody Plus was felt to be too expensive, and so alternative ways of supporting this group of persistent offenders were sought.

So the precursors to IOM were all these initiatives: loss of Custody Plus; PPO schemes, the DIP schemes, and the success of some of the processes developed – multiagency partnerships; pathways interventions and third sector engagement; co-location and role of police engagement and enforcement – all quite important in the gestation of IOM.

The development of multi-agency partnerships such as MAPPA⁴ (Kemshall *et al.*, 2005), bringing agencies together to focus on a single issue, intervening through the pathways in resettlement developments – a strand on employment, education and training, a strand on housing and a strand on drugs and alcohol – gave further impetus and coordination (Senior, 2003). It also brought the third sector very much into the work that was developing (Senior with Meadows *et al.*, 2004). The third sector had a lot of skills, a lot of abilities, but they had often been sidelined in much of this work. The pathways focus meant that the statutory services needed to link in to employment agencies, housing, mental health,

⁴ Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) is the name given to arrangements in England and Wales introduced by the Criminal Justice and Courts Services Act 2000 for the management of registered sex offenders, violent and other types of sexual offenders, and offenders who pose a serious risk of harm to the public.

mentoring agencies, etc. Co-location – putting people in the same work space to work together – also became important, and that will be an important point to return to later.

Crucial to an understanding of IOM is the changing role of the police and their engagement in other roles beyond enforcement (their key role in PPOs had been catch and control only). This notion of the police and probation working together may seem obvious now, but actually was not the norm in the 1980s and even into the 1990s. What can be seen in these programmes is a real change of attitude and engagement, with arrangements for the police and probation and other agencies beginning to work together. The final thing that began to emerge around 2003/4 was a case management model developed by the National Offender Management Service that gave more coherence to case management than there had been for a long time in the Probation Service.

In the research that we did on the pioneer areas (Senior *et al.*, 2011), the best practice model developed actually reflects very much the principles of the offender management model, ASPIRE (see Grapes and NOMS Offender Management Team, 2006) and is similar to the ‘Models of Care’ idea developed by DIP (National Treatment Agency, 2002). It is important to build on similar models that are around when developing new initiatives rather than always reinventing the model.

So what is IOM? It is not a simple thing to define because it is a range of initiatives captured under an umbrella term, IOM, seen more as a way of working by staff than as a specific, delineated programme. In contrast, for instance, IAC (Wong *et al.*, 2012) could have been demonstrated with a single diagram, because the programme there was absolutely delineated – what the elements were in the probation order, how it was done and how it was administered.

Each IOM scheme – and there are somewhere between 67 and 100 different IOM schemes in the UK now – operates slightly differently. They articulate a way of working rather than a single programme, and regard this not as a weakness but as being focused on what a local community and the service user might want and need. They often encompass interventions pioneered from the related schemes of PPO and DIP, but in many different ways. IOM is really best conceptualised as a continuum of services targeted at offenders with particular offence patterns and/or by need. So who IOM is targeted at changes over time and over area. Important to the overarching concept is the pooling of knowledge, resources and skills in a multi-agency partnership, ensuring

that agencies work together effectively and this drives decisions about process. IOM also gave a renewed focus to the neglected short-term custody prisoner who was without statutory supervision on release.

One image that has been used is to describe IOM like a human body – extremely complex and integrated in ways we do not always clearly understand, but each part vital in order to function effectively: different agencies with different priorities, different agendas and different targets, but all developing a single organisational model of delivery, working together to achieve a reduction in reoffending. There is no doubt that IOM needs to be sold effectively to court, to communities and to each agency involved.

Branding has been developed in the UK but not without problems. So we have *Impact*, *Spotlight*, *Revolution*, we have all sorts of names describing the same type or set of interventions. Interestingly our discussions to call the potential IOM scheme in Ireland something different would not have this problem, because you only have one brand: once you have decided what you want to call it, it could then be done across Ireland, so you do not have the problem that exists in England and Wales of all these different brands competing with each other as a brand of IOM. So maybe naming is not so much of a problem here in Ireland.

But it is important that there be a clarity about what it is you are going to do, and that you talk to all the agencies that lie on the periphery of this; particularly important I think are the courts, the communities you are going to work in, and each agency that might have a peripheral but key involvement such as housing agencies, job centre, employment agency. It is not necessarily driven by court or custodial orders *per se*, and I think that is significant.

As researchers, when undertaking the first piece of research (Senior *et al.*, 2011) the team were very concerned about the potential human rights issues in this. My background is in probation, and probation only intervenes in cases where it has a statutory right to intervene, or a voluntary duty as used to be ascribed to probation in terms of voluntary after-care many years ago. If probation did not have a basis on which to intervene, it did not intervene. What IOM developed is that you could intervene with somebody who is under no obligation whatsoever to take part in these programmes, so what does that mean? And does that abuse their human rights? It is an interesting question, and we interrogated this issue when we first started the research, but did not find examples of the kinds of human rights abuses we had projected.

In fact what was found gives two key learning points: agencies like the police and prisons were used to dealing with people who were not under the very restrictive notion of a statutory order; and it was only probation that had this notion of a statutory order driving their practice. The police deal with people who come before them; if they have got a reason to intervene with somebody, they intervene with them. So they were not restricted in that philosophical sense. Secondly, the research showed that offenders welcomed intensive engagement if it gave them something positive around change.

At first when I first come onto it I had officers for the first three weeks, every night I had police officers coming round checking up on me, making sure I was all right, making sure I'm good, but it was good because it wakes you up a little bit. (Service user quoted in Senior et al., 2011, p. 27)

So offenders themselves, by and large, were not actually upset by that intensive involvement; they welcomed it even though the regime was intensive and included interventions on a daily basis, could involve the police calling round to check that they are OK, to get them to their meetings and so on – generally they welcomed that engagement.

Should IOM be limited to certain groups of offenders? Is it a programme that only operates well with particular types of offenders? Or is it THE approach to offender management for the future? Does it have flexibility and range? The legacy of PPO programmes was a focus on acquisitive offenders – burglary and theft and dishonesty offences – and because IOM grew a little bit out of PPO, so IOM initially often focused on acquisitive offenders. But this has expanded and diversified and includes criminal damage and public order, dangerousness and a full range of offences. So IOM is applicable across the board and does not have to be focused in a singular catchment group.

The key question is: what works and what are the real problems in the area that you are working with in terms of offending patterns? Having identified what the key problems are, that becomes the focus of attention. Earlier there was a fascinating exercise looking at area statistics to identify who were the most frequent reoffenders in that area, and that gave a clear steer as to the potential problems. This would then be checked out with the local community, as they see those people that are causing them the most problems and that begins to be the target group.

What does all this mean for offenders themselves? Does it matter if offenders on the scheme do not understand the difference between IOM and PPO and *Spotlight* and *Impact* and all the rest? Research would suggest that it does not matter (Senior *et al.*, 2011).

Service users understand when they are receiving an intervention. I have interviewed hundreds of offenders over the past few years on IOM, and they will talk about being on probation, but if you say to them ‘could you tell me about your experiences on integrated offender management?’ they will stare back at you and say ‘I’ve not been involved in that – oh, you mean probation’, or they will talk about being a ‘prolific’, which I think is an interesting term: they get that from the PPO scheme, internalise it and see themselves as ‘prolific’. They do understand what they are getting, though: they understand the benefits and commitment.

You’re going to get a police officer come round your house and you’re going to go to probation every week and it’s going to be more tougher, it’s like probation but a more tougher probation. (Service user quoted in Senior *et al.*, 2011, p. 25)

The voluntary nature of IOM was perceived as positive by those same offenders, and actually is likely to increase engagement and compliance over time. It was interesting that when they saw that something was happening to them that was positive and assisted them in trying to achieve what is a very difficult change towards desistance, they would co-operate and take part. The perception was that they were not alone any more, and this is crucial for offenders.

Instead of having police coming and saying you’re arrested or throwing you in jail and roughing you up, it’s coming and they’re trying to help you and I think that makes a big difference in people’s lives ’cause they’re actually coming to help you, not coming to stick you back behind the door. (Service user, quoted in Senior *et al.*, 2011, p. 23)


What IOM is trying to achieve is a shift from criminal subcultures back into a ‘normal’ culture within the community, and that means offenders have to change their allegiances but so does the community, and that’s the important element: it is a two-way process. If the community does not let offenders back in – and that is often the experience that offenders have – then it is difficult for them to leave one set of social networks for

another less certain or maybe not welcoming social network, and they're likely to drift back to the people they know and the situations they know.

Offenders often reported to us that they wished they had had IOM much sooner in their criminal journey, but also many of them said – and this was very interesting in terms of desistance theory – that you can only stop offending when you are ready. The notion governments have got hold of is that somehow probation services and prisons are not doing their job because they are not reducing someone's reoffending. It could be that they are not doing their job well, but it could be that the circumstances are simply not right for somebody to change their behaviour. Desistance theory (Maruna, 2001) suggests that people have to be motivated, they have to be ready for change, and it is only when they are willing to take up those experiences that we can really expect to see meaningful change in their behaviour.

Figure 1 highlights the major agencies that the 2013 survey identified as involved in IOM across England and Wales. More important is the pattern here: you see police and probation involved in most of the schemes, more or less 100%, but only about 50–55% for the prison service, and one thing the research strongly suggests is to think about prison engagement from the outset. In developing IOM for people who

Figure 1. Agencies reported to be involved in local IOM arrangements (Home Office, 2013)



have been in custody and back out into the community, there needs to be an effective and continuous link from what goes on in custody through and back into the community. It is the breakdown of that link that often causes a lot of difficulties in its own right.

The points raised so far are summarised in the Home Office and Ministry of Justice's 2010 set of key principles:

- all partners tackling offenders together
- delivering a local response to local problems
- offenders facing their responsibilities or facing the consequences
- making better use of existing programmes and governance
- all offenders at high risk of harm and/or reoffending are in scope (Home Office/MoJ, 2010).

What do you need to do if you are to get IOM right in developing it in Ireland? These are a few key areas that our research has focused on; there are many practice protocols too that will be needed such as the right matrices, the right forms, the right processes, the information protocols, but there is not space to discuss the detail here, rather this is a focus on the core issues without which you cannot bring this jigsaw of IOM together. I would summarise them as:

- clear governance and delivery structures
- clear identification and demarcation of offenders in scope
- recognise the heightened role of police
- understand the crucial interfaces
- draw on models of offender management/case management
- develop effective partnerships by pooling resources.

Some of the problems identified from the research are really down to poor governance and confusion over governance, particularly over leadership, both at a strategic level and at a delivery level. In fact, unless the two levels work together and do not conflict it is likely to fail. It is no good having strategic commitment at the top of the police, at the top of probation, at the top of the Prison Service, but having delivery people who do not know what it is they are supposed to be delivering. It is really important that the strategists actually convey what they want from their practitioners.

There is an inherent complexity in joined-up working, with multiple layers of authority and responsibility, and everyone needs to own and work to the same blueprint. Key agencies must sit within the IOM delivery body. Core agencies include the police, probation, prisons, DIP/CJIT⁵ and YOTs,⁶ and supporting agencies include health, third sector, housing, employment, training and education, financial inclusion agencies, drug and alcohol agencies and mentoring agencies.

Secondly, having a clear identification and demarcation of offenders who are in scope for IOM is vital. You cannot have a loose, ill-defined entry criterion in your scheme that can let anyone in who you feel might benefit from this programme. Somehow in the willingness to be all-embracing we often let people on programmes who should not really be there. It can be very hard to gate-keep entry but it is absolutely important to do that for something like IOM. If you do not focus on the right people then you really are building in problems for later on. And you need to engage your local stakeholders in the decisions about who you are prioritising. You may think that one group is the priority, but you need to check that out in the local community – is that the same problem that they perceive themselves as having?

Partnerships must first decide the nature of offending and/or risk that they wish to have an impact on and then develop effective selection/deselection processes within IOM: dynamic mechanisms, use of police intelligence, RAG schemas,⁷ daily task meetings, and links with beat police, multi-agency reviews and so on.

An important, and arguably the most distinctive, feature of IOM is recognising the heightened role of the police. In many respects this is a new way of thinking for the police and it is only very recently that the police would not have conceived themselves doing the things that are done within IOM. There are three roles that the police play in IOM: intelligence gathering, enforcement and managing offenders. Bringing police intelligence into the IOM team is crucial. Instead of collecting

⁵ A Criminal Justice Integrated Team (CJIT), made up of health workers, Probation Officers, police officers and staff from the voluntary sector, provides access to drug and alcohol treatment for offenders including DIP.

⁶ A Youth Offending Team (YOT) is a multi-agency team dealing with young offenders co-ordinated by a local authority and overseen by the Youth Justice Board in England and Wales. YOTs were established following the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act.

⁷ RAG (red, amber, green) is a system for identifying categories of offenders used in IOM pioneer areas (Senior *et al.*, 2011).

intelligence for their benefit only, they use the information that is collected to help guide the interventions of the team as a whole. At first police officers were concerned that they brought intelligence in but did not get back intelligence from the other agencies. Over time this has begun to break down because probation staff, initially mistrustful of giving information back to the police, realised that a sharing of information actually enhanced the views that the police had and took all the IOM team down different paths of action. So police intelligence is one crucial role within IOM.

The second is enforcement, not surprisingly, but this is rather different to the catch-and-convict role that PPO schemes exemplified. Catch and convict was focused on arrest – locking them up – and that was the end goal and fitted with the traditional object that police have had in law enforcement.

What was happening in IOM was that enforcement was being reshaped, driving enforcement practices with a positive goal, not just with that negative goal of locking somebody up. Enforcement, as conceived within IOM, is an action that brings service users back to the table, by bringing them into other interventions, thus creating a more constructive way of dealing with enforcement and helping the users stay on track. The ‘disruption’ activities, sometimes named ‘assertive outreach’, are a legitimate role that the police play, and what the IOM interaction was enhancing was the continued engagement in activities. It also meant that police would advise their beat colleagues not to intervene, to stay away from that person when they had them on track.

The third role that the police began to play changed the nature and breadth of police engagement. This was almost rehabilitation activity. It came about for two reasons. First, the police had numbers: they are a much bigger organisation than anyone else in this system, so if they want to be engaged they can put people in, and if they decide to commit to it then they put lots of people in. Second, the Probation Trusts in the UK were extremely slow off the mark in general at picking up their role in the rehabilitative end, and that was partly a resourcing issue.

This resulted in police officers beginning to call themselves ‘offender managers’, and they began to do the kind of case management that you would normally expect to be done by probation staff. Interestingly, in the recent inspectorate report (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014) they have tried to call a halt to that activity, because they think, and this is probably right in principle, that the police should mainly keep to the role

that the police are good at and probation should mainly keep to the role that they are good at, and other agencies similarly have their own expertise. The double bind of the police in this is that their 'can do' attitude gets them involved very quickly and is very important to them, but also it needs to be reined in in terms of what might be the right modulated approach for particular service users.

Police officers, in particular, had often received insufficient or no training to work in a rehabilitative role with offenders. In the absence of probation or other partnership resources, police officers were sometimes undertaking tasks that might be more efficiently carried out by others. Where this had happened, although the police were acting in the spirit of partnership, they were often meeting a need that should have been fulfilled by probation that would otherwise have gone unmet. (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014, p. 32)

There are a number of key interfaces at which effective communication and liaison will help IOM work, including between prison and community intervention, between YOTs and IOM, between IOM and the court system and engagement of the third sector. The relationship between prison and community intervention will create a vital continuity for the individual as they go into prison, through the prison system, come out on resettlement and come into an IOM provision. This is not easy to do effectively. For example, a successful in-prison scheme called CARAT (Counselling, Assessment, Referral, Advice and Through care) was a scheme for drug users in prison and on release set up in 1999 (Home Office Findings, 2005). The CARAT system was set up to work with people in prison and would follow them into the community and work with them in the community. It never really got meaningfully beyond the prison gates until the DIP programme started, and this is key to the continuity of care.

A second interface is between young offenders and IOM, that transitional period, at 18 when service users come under the aegis of probation. It is important that this interface be managed properly. Often these are the people that fall out of the system, do not get transferred properly and then they are the ones who offend very heavily. YOTs need to be part of IOM strategic management to ensure such transition works to the benefit of the users.


Thirdly, effective relationships between IOM schemes and the court system are also vital so that the court system understands what is happening on these schemes to ensure that any subsequent sentencing reflects an awareness of this work. Finally, engagement of the third sector, who often have skills that are simply not present in the statutory sector, needs to be welcomed. This is also about ensuring that they have a place at the strategic table and a place at the delivery table. Sometimes if they are kept at arm's length they will not engage.

Co-location has been seen as a critical success factor for the success of IOM. Most IOM schemes, where they can, have located their delivery team in the same place, sometimes in a police or probation building, or sometimes in a voluntary sector or local authority building. These all create issues but they have proved crucial to positive working relations (Senior *et al.*, 2011, pp. 19–20). What is interesting about this is that co-location is different to merging; it is not just a matter of words. Though the police, probation, prison (where possible) and all the voluntary sector workers come into a shared space, they all maintain their links and their management structures to their parent agency.

The research tells us here quite strongly that it is actually the distinctiveness of their contribution that makes co-location work. We observed this in the fieldwork we undertook because we saw arguments, we saw disagreements, we saw differences of perspective all the time, but these differences gave the outcome much more resonance for both the offender and the interventions.

In England and Wales we have YOTs that were created in 1998 which brought together in a single unit police officer, Probation Officer, social worker, health worker and an education worker. Fifteen years down the road we now have youth offending teams with five youth offending workers who used to belong to police, probation and so on. Bringing them together and merging them into a single operational unit meant that they began to lose their distinctive identity with their parent organisation; line management was also delivered within the YOT unit.

IOM integration works because people remain who they came in as, so they keep that agency perspective. The clash of perspective between police, probation, prison and the voluntary sector is the dynamic that actually makes the policy and practice direction so resolute. Figure 2 highlights the key elements that need to be considered in developing effective co-location. This is drawn from the research undertaken by Senior *et al.* (2011, p. 20).

Figure 2. Issues in co-location (taken from Senior *et al.*, 2011, p. 20)

The final key practice question is how IOM engages offenders in this process. I think we asked a lot in the research about how you find ways of engaging the offenders more constructively in the process, a concept that we would now call co-production. One service user stated:

I sort of watch and listen to offender management services and understand it's all one body, the prisons work with probation and the police and social services, just everything basically has all become one. (Senior et al., 2011)

Service users understand the messages that multi-agency cooperation is intending to give. Intensive engagement, even when non-statutory, was welcomed as supportive, not coercive. Co-location for the offender produces a single, cooperative message which is understood. The police role is accepted – disruption activities or the more euphemistic ‘assertive outreach’ – but also they emphasise that self-motivation is still the key in successful engagement, supporting desistance work.

It's better now really because I know everyone on my record and it means I don't have to say the same story to four different people each time: that's good.

they genuinely care or it's their job

it's about me doing better for myself and they ask how you're doing, are you using, are you committing crime, they do try to lure you into a trap genuinely because they do care about you a little bit.

it made me feel quite good, it made me feel quite normal instead. (Senior *et al.*, 2011)

In drawing to a conclusion, two further questions need to be asked. Does IOM work? Does the evidence support the development of IOM as an approach? Wong notes that:

One of the strengths of IOM is it is largely developed as a bottom up innovation. In evaluation terms this is one of its weaknesses ... Attempting to identify the additionality of IOM, i.e. what local agencies were doing differently as a result of IOM, was difficult across the IOM pioneer sites as they have developed in very different ways. It still remains difficult, given local variations between schemes. (Wong, 2013, p. 63)

A number of qualitative and quantitative evaluations are listed in the introduction to this paper. In many respects the qualitative evaluations are better because they ask meaningful questions, giving insights that are usable in terms of further developing IOM as a practice initiative. It is a lot harder to produce the high-level quantitative evaluations that focus on what works and reductions in reoffending.

Wong (2013) explores a range of technical questions, but there remains a genuine difficulty in attributing change to IOM. There are ways of getting there, but this should not be underestimated. The shifting nature of the IOM cohort itself as its members move through on a traffic-light RAG means that they do not always get the same level of intervention at points in their progress, which raises difficult practical research questions about measuring impact. Also, usually policy makers want the results in far too short a timeline, as Pawson suggests:

evaluation research is tortured by time constraints, the policy cycle revolves quicker than the research cycle with the result that real

time evaluation often has little influence on policy-making. (Pawson, 2002, p. 1)

The relationship between contract research and evaluation is complex and fraught with difficulties, and is beyond the scope of this paper. This topic is discussed elsewhere in detail (see Senior, 2013). Clearly independent, authoritative and structured evaluations of the cost and benefits of IOM in terms of crime reduction, reduced frequency and/or serious reoffending and eventual desistance from crime should be attempted. But this will take resources, time and research designs that can be both high-quality and reliable. This may be beyond local projects.

Having said that, what can be done? The first thing you must do is involve your evaluators at the outset: as a programme sets off, build in an evaluation, and talk to the evaluators at the start because how you design the programme, what data you collect as the project develops, and how, will be the information that those evaluators can use later to assess its effectiveness. If you do not do that and only involve evaluators 18 months down the line, it will store up problems. Document, record and identify additionality, know what is different about IOM from what they received before and be able to cost it. Reoffending as an outcome measure can be achieved if you have good access to Police National Computer (PNC) data, and you might be able to achieve that. Of course even if impact evaluation on a reconviction study is obtained it will not explain why it worked, so more qualitative analyses will be needed as well.

My second concluding comment relates to how IOM may develop in England and Wales following Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) (Ministry of Justice, 2013). IOM had been developed prior to TR as a co-operative model, both for multi-service delivery and from the physical co-location of staff, but also in terms of engaging non-statutory service users in resettlement following release from prison. Such an approach emphasises a number of key relational aspects of practice: co-working among agencies, co-production with service users, co-location and multi-agency perspective, user-defined outcomes, intensive engagement and pooling of budgets.

Does this model of IOM only work where services are co-operatively shaped and managed, and would a competitive environment send out paradoxical messages to service users? That is a question that will be asked in England and Wales following TR, because though IOM has been

very successfully launched, moving from this co-operative model to the more competitive environment of TR potentially puts IOM at risk. These histories are only just being written, so there will be a need to watch this space and consider what impact the change of commissioning environment may have for the continued development of IOM.

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